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The Utah State Tax Commission replies to the Brief of 
Appellees as follows: 
I. THE BROAD CONSTRUCTION OF § 59-10-106(1) URGED BY THE 
TAXPAYERS IS IMPROPER AND IS FOUNDED ON AN ERRONEOUS 
AND OVERLY-BROAD VIEW OF THE PURPOSE OF THE TAX CREDIT. 
The Tax Commission has urged this Court to strictly 
construe Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-106(1)(West 2004) since the 
statute grants a tax credit. This Court has applied "the 
well-established principle that tax exemption statutes are 
to be strictly construed against the party claiming the 
exemption and all ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of 
taxation." Morton International v. Auditing Div. of the Utah 
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581, 591 (Utah 1991). That 
same principle of strict construction should apply equally 
to credit statutes. 3A Sutherland Statutory Construction 
§66:9 (6th ed., updated 2005); State Dept. of Assessments 
and Taxation v. Belcher, 553 A.2d 691, 695 (Md. 1989) (the 
rule of strict construction for exemption statutes is 
"equally applicable when tax credits are implicated"); Team 
Specialty Products v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Dept., 
107 P.3d 4, 7 (N.M. App. 2004) T[t]ax credits are strictly 
matters of legislative grace and are to be construed against 
the taxpayer", quoting Murphy v. Taxation and Revenue Dept., 
607 P.2d 628, 631 (N.M. App. 1979)). The Taxpayers urge a 
1 
broad construction of the credit statute, contrary to the 
well-reasoned policy supporting strict construction. 
The Taxpayers have advanced an overly-broad view of the 
purpose of the credit statute. Nothing in § 59-10-106(1) 
suggests that the Legislature anticipated the issue before 
this Court. Indeed, absence of any specific statutory 
reference to the pass-through of income to S corporation 
shareholders or the treatment of taxes imposed on S 
corporations suggests just the opposite, i.e. that the 
Legislature was merely addressing the common situation where 
a Utah resident has income from sources outside of Utah and 
is subjected to individual income tax in the jurisdictions 
where that income was earned. In this common situation, the 
statute serves to eliminate duplicative individual income 
tax. To suggest that the purpose goes beyond this is merely 
unsupported speculation on the part of the Taxpayers. 
The absence of a specific statutory credit for S 
corporation shareholders for taxes paid by an S corporation 
led to the administrative actions underlying this appeal. 
In these administrative proceedings, the Taxpayers achieved 
partial victory when the Tax Commission held that a credit 
would be allowed for another state's tax if the tax was 
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imposed "on income," even if the tax fell upon and was paid 
by the S corporation rather than the individual 
shareholders. This result was in harmony with both Utah's 
treatment of S corporations as pass-through entities as 
addressed in Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-702 (West 2004), and with 
a strict construction of § 59-10-106(1). By granting a 
credit for such taxes, and limiting the credit to taxes 
imposed "on income," the Tax Commission asserts that there 
has been compliance with the requirements of the statute and 
that the purpose of the statute has been fulfilled. 
Section 59-10-106(1) does not eliminate duplicative 
taxation in all situations, and nothing in the statute 
suggests that this was its purpose. Shareholders of a C 
corporation pay individual income tax on dividends, even 
though the C corporation is subject to corporate franchise 
tax on the income from which the dividends are paid. The 
Taxpayers concede that the credit under § 59-10-106(1) would 
not be allowed for franchise taxes imposed on an S 
corporation that are measured by something other than income 
(e.g. the Texas tax on net taxable capital), thus 
acknowledging the need to comply with the language of the 
credit statute, yet this concession undermines their 
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assertion regarding the purpose of the statute since both 
the S corporation and its shareholders are subjected to tax 
in that situation. Likewise, in this case, where an S 
corporation is subject to another state's corporate 
franchise tax (other than a tax "on income'') either as a 
result of that state's refusal to mirror the federal pass-
through treatment of S corporations (e.g. Texas) or as a 
result of the S corporation's failure to make a required 
state election to be afforded the pass-through treatment 
(e.g. California), § 59-10-106(1) does not provide a credit 
against the individual income tax of the shareholders for 
the S corporation's franchise tax.1 
While the shareholders are not entitled to an individual 
income tax credit for the corporate franchise tax paid to 
California and Texas, they do benefit from the S corporation's 
deduction of such taxes. The S corporation is entitled to deduct 
the California and Texas corporate franchise taxes as an expense 
of doing business, thus reducing the amount of net income which 
is passed through to the shareholders and included in the 
shareholders' taxable income. If a credit for corporate 
franchise taxes which have already been deducted from income is 
granted, the double benefit of both a deduction and a credit for 
the tax would accrue to the shareholders. The Taxpayers have 
recognized that this would yield an unfair result and have 
conceded that an add-back of the franchise tax deduction is 
necessary if the credit is granted. 
4 
II. TAXPAYERS' FAILURE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN "TAXES 
IMPOSED ON INCOME" AND "TAXES MEASURED BY INCOME" 
FOR PURPOSES OF THE CREDIT IS IMPROPER AND IS 
FOUNDED ON AN ERRONEOUS AND OVERLY-BROAD VIEW OF 
THE PURPOSE OF THE TAX CREDIT. 
The Taxpayers acknowledge that a distinction remains 
today between "taxes imposed on income" and "taxes measured 
by income." Brief of Appellees at pp. 27-28. Further, they 
acknowledge that this distinction is important, at least in 
the context of the taxation of federal obligations. Brief 
of Appellees at p. 28. 
The Tax Commission agrees that this distinction remains 
and is important, but further asserts that the distinction 
is vital in the proper application of the credit allowed 
under § 59-10-106(1). The statutory language provides a 
credit only for taxes imposed "on income." 
The Taxpayers are in essence asking the Court to ignore 
both the statutory language granting the credit and the 
distinction between "taxes imposed on income" and "taxes 
measured by income" when reviewing the California and Texas 
corporate franchise taxes. This request is once again 
founded upon an asserted purpose of the credit statute that 
is overly-broad and has no basis in the language of the 
statute (see part I above). The Taxpayers again suggest 
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that the realization of this alleged purpose trumps strict 
construction of the statute which limits the credit to taxes 
imposed "on income." The Tax Commission urges this Court to 
reject the Taxpayers' attempt to: (1) assert an overly-broad 
purpose of the statute, (2) use the overly-broad purpose as 
justification for abandonment of strict construction of the 
credit statute, and (3) use the overly-broad purpose as 
justification for ignoring the distinction between "taxes 
imposed on income" and "taxes measured by income." 
III. THE TAXPAYERS' CHARACTERIZATION OF THE TEXAS 
CORPORATION FRANCHISE TAX AS EITHER A TAX ON 
INCOME OR A MINIMUM TAX ON CAPITAL IS INCORRECT. 
While § 59-10-106(1) allows a credit for taxes imposed 
"on income," the Texas corporation franchise tax is based on 
a formula that includes both net taxable capital and net 
taxable earned surplus components. While the argument can 
be made that the net taxable earned surplus component is 
similar to net income, it is not the only component of the 
Texas formula. As set forth in Texas Tax Code § 171.002(b) 
and (c) : 
(b) The amount of franchise tax on each 
corporation is computed by adding the 
following: 
(1) the amount calculated by applying the 
tax rate prescribed by Subsection (a)(1) 
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to the corporation's net taxable capital; 
and 
(2) the difference between: 
(A) the amount calculated by 
applying the tax rate prescribed by 
Subsection (a) (2) to the 
corporation's net taxable earned 
surplus; and 
(B) the amount determined under 
Subdivision (1). 
(c) In making the computation under 
Subsection (b), an amount computed under 
Subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2) that is zero 
or less is computed as a zero. 
The Tax Commission has held that a credit is not available 
for the Texas tax since it is not a tax "on income," but 
rather a franchise tax calculated through the use of a 
formula with two components, only one of which is similar to 
net income. 
The Taxpayers argue that the Texas tax is, depending 
upon the amounts of net taxable earned surplus and net 
taxable capital, either a tax on income in its entirety (if 
4.5% of net taxable earned surplus exceeds 0.25% of net 
taxable capital) or a tax on capital in its entirety (if 
0.25% of net taxable capital exceeds 4.5% of net taxable 
earned surplus). This approach adopts a shortcut which 
determines the correct amount of the corporate franchise 
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tax, but fails to fully reflect the formula and components 
as set forth in the Texas statute. 
The computation of the Texas corporation franchise tax 
as set forth in the Texas statute can be illustrated using a 
hypothetical of three S corporations, A, B, and C, each 
having $400,000 of net taxable earned surplus, but different 
amounts of net taxable capital. Each would calculate its 
Texas tax using the same statutory formula of: 
0.25% x net taxable capital -f ((4.5% x net taxable 
earned surplus) - (0.25% x net taxable capital), 
but not less than zero) 
If A had $1,000,000 of net taxable capital, its Texas tax 
would be computed as follows: 
0.25% x $1,000,000 + ((4.5% x $400,000) - (0.25% x 
$1,000,000), but not less than zero) 
or 
$2,500 + ($18,000 - $2,500) = 
$2,500 + $15,500 = 
$18,000 tax 
If B had $10,000,000 of net taxable capital, its Texas tax 
would be computed as follows: 
0.25% x $10,000,000 + ((4.5% x $400,000) - (0.25% 
x $10,000,000) , but not less than zero) 
or 
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$25,000 + zero (since $18,000 - $25,000 is less 
than zero) = 
$25,000 tax 
If C had $2,000,000 of net taxable capital, its Texas tax 
would be computed as follows: 
0.25% x $2,000,000 + ((4.5% x $400,000) - (0.25% x 
$2,000,000), but not less than zero) 
or 
$5,000 + ($18,000 - $5,000) = 
$5,000 + $13,000 = 
$18,000 tax 
Under this hypothetical, the Taxpayers would claim that 
shareholders of corporations A and C are entitled to a 
credit of $18,000, while shareholders of corporation B are 
not entitled to any credit since its $25,000 tax would be a 
minimum tax based on capital. Corporation B would be 
treated differently, even though all three corporations had 
the same amount of net taxable earned surplus. 
If the shareholders of the corporations in the 
hypothetical had waived their claim to a portion of the 
Texas tax, as the Reagans did during the administrative 
proceeding before the Tax Commission, and therefore claimed 
credit only for the difference between 4.5% of net taxable 
earned surplus and 0.25% of net taxable capital, the 
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Taxpayers would claim that shareholders of corporation A are 
entitled to a credit of $15,500, shareholders of corporation 
C are entitled to a credit of $13,000, and shareholders of 
corporation B are not entitled to any credit, even though 
all three once again had the same amount of net taxable 
earned surplus.2 
The absurd results due to fluctuations in net taxable 
capital as illustrated by the above hypothetical led the 
Missouri Supreme Court to hold that "dividing the Texas 
tax's income component from its capital component is 
impossible." Brennan v. Director of Revenue, 937 S.W.2d 
210, 212 (Mo. 1997). The Tax Commission agrees with the 
Missouri court and asserts that the Texas corporation 
franchise tax is not a tax on income and cannot be divided 
into income and capital components. A tax which is 
calculated utilizing a net earned surplus component as one 
of multiple components does not constitute a tax on income 
for which a credit can be claimed pursuant to § 59-10-
2
 As acknowledged in the Brief of Appellees, the 
shareholders in the cases of Perez v. Department of Rev, and 
Taxation, 731 So. 2d 406 (La. App., 1st Dist. 1999) and Avni v. 
Dept. of Rev., 2000 WL 1059520 (Or. Tax Magistrate Div. 2000), 
like the Reagans, limited their claims to the difference between 
4.5% of the net taxable earned surplus and 0.25% of the net 
taxable capital. 
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106(1) . 
IV. THE TAXPAYERS AND AMICUS ERR IN FOCUSING ON THE 
UTAH CORPORATE FRANCHISE TAX SINCE THE CALIFORNIA 
AND TEXAS FRANCHISE TAXES ARE AT ISSUE RATHER THAN 
THE UTAH TAX. 
The Taxpayers devote a substantial portion of their 
brief to an analysis of Utah's tax framework, including 
provisions relating to the Utah corporate franchise tax and 
the constitutionally mandated funding of public education. 
As pointed out in the Tax Commission's initial brief, Utah's 
corporate franchise tax is not at issue in this case. At 
issue is whether the Taxpayers are entitled to take a credit 
to reduce their Utah individual income taxes by the amount 
of California and Texas corporate franchise taxes paid by 
the S corporations in which they have an ownership interest. 
An amicus brief has been filed by the Utah State Board 
of Education in support of the Taxpayers' position. 
Ironically, if the Taxpayers prevail, individual income tax 
revenues which are constitutionally mandated for public 
education will be reduced in the amount of the California 
and Texas corporate franchise taxes claimed as credits. 
While the Tax Commission understands the Board of 
Education's interest in suggesting that the Court's decision 
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should not undermine the Board's ability to assert that Utah 
corporate franchise tax is a tax on income within the 
meaning of Utah Const, art. XIII, § 5(5)(effective January 
1, 2003, replacing art. XIII, § 12(3)), the Tax Commission 
once again asserts that this is not the issue before the 
Court.3 Rather, the issue is whether the statute granting a 
credit against Utah individual income tax should be strictly 
construed, thus limiting the credit to taxes imposed "on 
income" by other states. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tax Commission has correctly denied Taxpayers 
credits against their Utah individual income tax for 
corporate franchise tax paid by the S corporations to 
California and Texas since those taxes were not imposed on 
income. The Tax Commission respectfully requests that its 
decisions in the Baker and Reagan cases be affirmed, and 
that the District Court's determination in the consolidated 
case of the MTC shareholders and the Macfarlanes be 
3
 Since the issue of whether Utah's corporate franchise tax 
is constitutionally required to be used for public education is 
not before the Court, at this time the Tax Commission neither 
reaffirms nor retracts statements contained in its 2003-2004 
Annual Report as quoted in the Brief of Appellees at p. 22. 
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reversed. 
DATED this &jks day of August, 2005 
MARK E. WAINWI^GHT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellant 
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